

Book #11

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4/29/04 Interview with General Paul Weaver

— M.K.  
— K. SHAFFER

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
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- Day of 9-11
- Took train to D.C. from Virginia.
- His office is on 12<sup>th</sup> Fl. of JP1 in Crystal City, Va.
- AALII had just hit WTC 1 when he arrived in his office.
- He is frozen on the T.V.
- He oversees the budget of the ANG.
- He says he "Commands nothing" as the Director of ANG.
- He saw 2<sup>nd</sup> A/C hit WTC-2.
- "Then I knew we were under attack"

- He heard noise from AOL 77 before it struck the Pentagon.
- He called Gen. Gary Arnold that morning. — most likely after Pentagon was hit.
- Gen Arnold said FAA was grounding all A/C. (all commercial A/C)
- Arnold said we are bringing up all our assets and Tankers.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> call to Gen Arnold — (1 to 1.5 hrs. into state of event)  
"What do you need?"
- Gen. Arnold said we still have 5 commercial A/C unaccounted for.
- He was impressed with Arnold's actions and has known him for many years.
- After events ended, he and Arnold ~~also~~ discussed the "What ifs" — (could we have done something better?)

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- He does not recall ever being briefed pre 9-11 on a threat ~~or~~ similar to the threat of 9-11.
- Gen. Arnold told him that they were given authority to shoot down ~~Commercial~~ Commercial A/C.
  - ↓
  - He interpreted Arnold's words to ~~be~~ mean a nationwide authority to shoot down commercial A/C.
- Paul Kimmel was Weaver's ~~chief~~ operating officer.
- He did not talk to Andrews AFB ~~at all~~ that morning during attacks.
- He talked to General Dave Wherley late in the day.
- 113<sup>th</sup> F.W. → D.C. in rail. Board.
  - ↳ Andrews AFB.
- Col. Sam Brooks was probably called to go to Andrews AFB early on the morning.

- Gen. Wherley - Cmdr. of D.C. Air Nat'l Guard.
- He was not brought into ROE discussions / Decisions.
- He learned about UAL 93 Crash from Gen. Arnold.
- Arnold was not sure first if military shot down UAL 93.
  - ↳ fact, on Arnold said he was absolutely sure military did not shoot down UAL 93.
- When they reviewed actions of fighter A/C later that day they realized no fighters were close to UAL 93 to shoot it down enough
- Afternoon of 9-11 - They started to piece together events of day.
- They started to secure JP 1.
- Not sure attacks were over.
- Then they discussed the "What if's?"

- Gen. Arnold discussed what if scenarios even though Arnold not in his chain of command.
- Weave replaced Gen. Dan Sheppard.
- Pre 9-11 → tremendous pressure to reduce AWG Alert sites below # that existed on 9-11.
- \* — need to get testimony before Senate by Gen. Sheppard (around 1995-96). → Senate suggested AWG Alert sites should be reduced.
- Pre 9-11 → AWG was "looking out". We were concerned with threats coming from Caribbean (South). — Still cruise missile threats, Soviet Bomber threat, ~~Rogue~~ nation threat.
- Afternoon of 9-11 →

Everybody was reviewing (including the media) the timing and timeline.

of the attacks.

- On 9/12/01 — he had discussions with DoD Public Affairs Office — Tony Clarke (~~Tim Thompson~~)
- He wanted to get timeline out immediately.
- DoD Public Affairs did not want immediate release of timeline.
- Air Force ~~the~~ Combatant Cmdr. did not really want timeline out.
- Mtg at Pentagon in afternoon of 9/12.
- He took the DoD in pulling timeline together.
- He believed it was import. to quickly release timeline.
- Dr. Arnold, Paul Kinnell, Gen. Wheeler, Tony Brooks,

etc. ~~etc.~~ gave him the basis for his understanding of timeline of events.

✓ NORAD Public Affairs people did not want to release timeline on 9/12 or 9/13.

\* — DoD Public Affairs never gave approval or Disapproval for release of timeline of events of 9-11.

— He wanted the story out

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→ He met w/ DoD public Affairs folks (in prior to DoD press conference. → This was normal SOP.

— He was not involved w/ FAA regarding reconstruction of events.

— NORAD (Gen. Eberhart) had the lead in dealing w/ FAA regarding reconstruction of events.

- The day he leaked information on timeline of events → Weare was chastised. → This prompted NORAD to issue its 9/18 press release.
- He heard from "back channels" that NORAD PA had a problem <sup>9/13</sup> when he briefed media on <sup>9/13</sup> timeline ~~of 9/11~~ at Pentagon.
- Ron Rand - 1<sup>st</sup> AF - was his POC.
- NEADS was sure when 24-48 hrs. of timeline of events.
- Don Aris was a POC at CONR.
- Col. Scott - ("good man" Weare says)
- NEADS/CONR/NORAD folks did not specifically tell Weare what sources they reviewed to reconstruct timeline of events.

- Re: UAL 93 - Weaver wants to know where the military A/C were in relation to UAL 93.
- Weaver says they were aware of UAL 93.
- Gen Arnold gave him the times of FAA notifications to the military.

→ Brig. General Doug Moore

→ He knows a Dr. Doug Moore from Fresno, California.

→ Paul Kimmel

→ Famy Brooks

→ Gen. Famy Arnold

## Gen. Paul Wren. Dir. ANG (former)

- private co hired by NY to west. internet re T found tons of embedded comms
- called Long flight away - we've got a prob.
  - \* after P impact
- CA tells him of grounding of all comms,  
+ bringing up all ANG assets.
  - ↳ PW pledges his full support
- 2<sup>nd</sup> call "How goes it, what do you need"
  - ↳ CA we're still got 5 unaccounted A/C (2 1 hr to 1.5 hr in to events)
  - + pretty much an open line to CA
- impressed w/ our (DoD/ANG) reactions
- - later that day looked @ the "what if's" of the response
  - Pre-9/11
  - can't recall ever being briefed on such a threat; our culture on "what if" scenarios all of the time.
  - mid 90's (95/96) Atlant. City 2 pilots on practice intercept on a commiss. Got well for this incident → wasn't really planned
  - RQE against commiss.
  - \* - Long Brooks (Dept COO, worked for Kinnell)

## Post Events

- looked @ ours, caselaw etc.

- next day press conf.

→ NOADS was not going to release anything.

My prob. w/ that was why.

- What If's Effort:

• extensively w/ LA, going through scenarios

• doesn't recall any threat briefings

• Sent Authorization Com

out → Can. Steppard's defense of Ar D. - 95/96  
 & told it was all "pork" spending

Ram steady.

8/12 - mly w/ Tom Clark pre Press Conf.

↳ did not want to go through twelve  
 publicly

- met w/ Tony

► case for LA, Paul Kinnell, Brooks  
 Whistler,

- We were told NOADS didn't want  
 it out (PA People) not recess. Gen E

- AF & A Ram hard

9/13 - we went through Timeline, telecons

we went through Timeline again + again.

NOADS very sure they had it when 48 hrs

① FIA Notif: Did that work?

→ from what we know @ the fire - yes.

Basically took notice fire + then worked + worked the response fire

② Langley Scramble

Paul Kornel - Retired, (Fr)

Craig Brooks -